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Do Credit Constraints Matter more for College Dropout Entrepreneurs? 
 
 
1 Introduction 
Start-ups are often seen as an important factor in economic growth and job creation (Birch, 
1979; Acs and Audretsch, 1990; Storey and Tether, 1996). However, entrepreneurial activity 
is often hampered by limited access to financial resources (e.g. Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; 
Lindh and Ohlson, 1996; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998). Banks hesitate to lend funds to 
new businesses because of capital market imperfections (Ang, 1991, 1992; Blumberg and 
Letterie, 2008). Outside financiers of a start-up usually have no relevant data about production 
facilities, processes, or product markets to use as benchmarks in evaluating a proposed 
business plan. Therefore, the value of a start-up project is difficult to judge, even for the most 
experienced of creditors. As a consequence, the asymmetric information gap between the 
founder of new firm and the creditor is likely to be extraordinarily large, potentially causing 
problems like credit rationing.i Creditors may finance only a fraction of assets and operations, 
claim high collateral, or shorten the length of their loans. Put differently, they might find 
investments in a start-up particularly risky, given the lack of history, reliable benchmarks, and 
prior reputation. To reduce the probability of a start-up becoming a failure, creditors of new 
ventures must find ways to overcome the initial problem of asymmetric information, i.e. find 
indicators that the founder will run their new venture successfully (see e.g. Binks and Ennew, 
1996; Egeln et al., 1997; Falk, 1999).   
The objective of our paper is to determine whether specific characteristics of the educational 
history of the founder can help creditors to solve or reduce this credit market problem. Using 
a screening design as the theoretical framework, we argue that creditors can assess the quality 
of the new venture by screening the educational biography of the founders. Since creditors 
cannot readily observe the quality of the new venture directly, they have an incentive to 
approximate that information via reliable indicators which correlate with their ex ante 
unobservable entrepreneurial productivity. According to our theoretical considerations we 
expect creditors to draw on “college dropout” as a quality signal when deciding upon start-up 
credit for a founder. Although there may also be other ways for highly productive 
entrepreneurs to signal the above average quality of their venture, such as collateral or bonds, 
we do not consider them to be a complete substitute for educational indicators but rather 
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complementary instruments, because in the special situation start-ups they are not available, 
or not to a sufficient degree (see Parker, 2004 for examples).   
To test our screening assumptions we use German firm level data collected in 1998/99, 
containing 189 start-ups which were founded between 1992 and 1997 in the Cologne area. All 
predictions are borne out by the data, leading us to conclude that screening for educational 
characteristics is an effective instrument for reducing the problems of asymmetric information 
on the credit market for new ventures. 
Note that the models specified and tested in our paper concentrate on access to debt capital 
and the impact of educational characteristics to reduce the difficulties to obtain the credit the 
founders need for their start-ups. Thus, our study is in line with previous research of Bates 
(1990), Storey (1996), Binks and Ennew, 1996, Blumberg and Letterie (2004) or Astebro and 
Bernhardt (2005). This paper is not concerned with new venture performance (e.g. survival 
duration, business profits, etc.) and direct effects on financial or human capital (see here for 
example Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Cooper et al.,1994; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen, 
1994; van Praag, 2003, Moog and Backes-Gellner, 2003 or Bosma et al., 2004, Parker and 
van Praag 2005).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we summarize the literature 
and derive some empirically testable hypotheses. In the third section on “Data, Measurement 
Issues, and Methodology” we describe our data set and discuss measurement and 
methodological issues. In the fourth section we present our econometric results; and finally, 
we summarize and draw some tentative conclusions.  
2 Literature and hypothesis 
To date, many papers focus on the efficiency of debt-financed ventures in general, and on 
credit rationing or under-investment in start-ups in particular. One strand of these papers 
assumes the existence of credit rationing and concentrates either on the causes of credit 
rationingii, on the effects of credit rationing on efficiency, or on the effects of corrective 
government actions on credit rationing (see Parker, 2004, sec. 5 for a survey of the literature). 
A second strand of papers argues that it is possible to eliminate credit rationing by using 
various instruments to reveal hidden quality information. These instruments range from 
reputation through relationship banking, signaling and/or screening to using collateral and 
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bonds. Examples of screening by banks offering a menu of contract options include collateral 
(cf. Bester, 1985), joint liability under group lending (cf. Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999); 
offering limited and unlimited liability debt contracts to entrepreneurs (cf. Chamley, 1983) 
and offering a high initial interest rate in a multi-period setting (cf. Webb, 1991; Boot and 
Thakor, 1994).  
Our paper is embedded in this second strand of literature. We argue that most of the 
instruments that reveal hidden information are unsuitable for start-ups since the business idea 
and the company is both totally new, there is no reputation or experience to build on. 
Sufficient collateral for example is often beyond the means of a typical founder and therefore 
banks often cannot even use extended collateral as a screening mechanism (Parker, 2004). In 
addition, lenders usually rely on ‘carcass’ evaluation and refrain from thoroughly screening 
every single entrepreneur’s credibility as this is unlikely to be cost effective. Ravid and 
Spiegel (1997) for example argue that start-ups in particular are too small and complex, 
economies of scale are non existent and therefore thorough individual screening does not pay. 
However, screening the educational biography of the founder is a plausible way of dealing 
with the information asymmetries of entrepreneurs, as it is cost-efficient and implies using a 
persons past behavior in other activities, namely higher education, to draw conclusions about 
their future productivity in a new venture.  
The role of educational characteristics for entrepreneurs has rarely been analyzed in depth, 
despite some early mentions in the economics literature. In the late 1970s there was a first 
discussion on how the educational degrees of employees vs. entrepreneurs could be used to 
test the educational screening hypothesis (cf. Wolpin, 1977; Lazear, 1977; or more recently, 
Lofstrom, 2000). Lazear (1977) for example has argued that educational characteristics might 
not be irrelevant for entrepreneurs because customers may use their credentials as a signal in 
assessing product quality. This argument has been systematically followed up recently by 
Backes-Gellner and Werner (2007). They show that innovative entrepreneurs signal their 
quality by means of certain characteristics of their educational history, namely entrepreneur's 
university degree and the actual length of university study. Parker and van Praag (2005) also 
study how the performance of a start-up is affected by capital constraints and human capital. 
According to their model, in the case of unobserved ability lenders use a common screening 
technology to assess ability and therefore rate all lenders with the same error, in the case of 
observed ability, lenders assess and classify ability by certified human capital (i.e. years of 
schooling), which is assumed to perfectly reflect ability. Parker and van Praag (2005) show 
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that under the assumption that physical capital and human capital are not complements, 
greater human capital decreases borrowing constraints.  
Yet, not all educational characteristics can serve alike as reliable productivity indicators. As 
shown by Spence (1973) initially there are several conditions that have to be met in order for 
an educational indicator to be able to guarantee a separating equilibrium, i.e. in our case an 
equilibrium which reliably separates entrepreneurs with high probability of success from 
entrepreneurs with low probability of success. First, the indicator must be closely related to 
the type of ability that is required of founders and makes them more likely to be successful 
with their new venture. Thus, the question that needs answering is what the ability 
requirements of firm founders and the requirements in the educational system are? As shown 
in a number of empirical studies, new venture markets are characterized by rapid 
technological change, short product life cycles, and rather volatile market conditions (see e.g. 
McDermott and O'Connor, 2002). Founders who want to survive in such an environment must 
be able to work continuously and rapidly through a large amount of new market information, 
quickly and efficiently filtering out what is important and flexibly deriving new solutions. 
Given this environment, a founder needs analytical and problem-solving skills, self-direction, 
and endurance (Lück and Böhmer, 1994). Now within the German educational system it is 
common knowledge that these general analytical and problem-solving skills are the ones 
required for university studies. They are considered to be indispensable for obtaining a 
university degree. We assume that college dropouts genuinely do not have these general 
analytical and problem-solving skills. Thus, compared to founders with a university degree or 
even compared to some other kind of occupational degree (and not having withdrawn from 
university) we assume college dropouts to run a start-up less successfully. Furthermore, the 
failure rate at German universities is quite high, making it very expensive for "low ability" 
students to complete studies for a university degree. In 2002 for example, the average failure 
rate was about 25 percent across all fields and universities (IWD, 2002). Thus, the cost for 
low ability students to obtain a university degree literally extends to infinity.  
However, a person’s educational history can only serve as a signal if it is available to the 
market partner looking for a screening device to overcome asymmetric information. Thus, it is 
necessary to determine whether banks as lenders can screen the founder's educational history 
in a cost-efficient way. Now Empirical studies show that commercial banks always use a 
number of screening devices to evaluate a start-up, among which a detailed business plan is 
indispensable (Egger and Gronemeier, 1999). A successful business plan provides detailed 
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information about the loan applicant via a CV showing educational institutions, fields and 
dates of study, and degrees (not) earned. Therefore, if banks consider being a college dropout 
as valuable information, they can easily obtain it and use it for their credit decision.  
To summarize, we expect the data to confirm that college dropout founders to have more 
problems obtaining the credit they ask for than founders without college dropout experience.  
3 Data, Measurement Issues, and Methodology  
To test our predictions about educational screening of banks, we analyze dataset of 189 start-
ups in the Cologne area. The data were collected in 1998/99 in a project on regional 
determinants and effects of entrepreneurship and cover a representative sample of start-ups 
from 1992 to 1997.iii For each start-up, we have a 6-page questionnaire with a broad spectrum 
of questions on the founder and his or her personal background (education, experience), the 
economic background of the start-up (sources and difficulties obtaining start-up capital), its 
current financial situation, human resources issues, production technology, networks, and 
social capital (for more details on the Cologne Founder Study, see Backes-Gellner, Demirer, 
and Moog, 2000). Almost two thirds of the start-ups are in the service sector (62 percent); a 
quarter is in retailing, and 13 percent are in manufacturing. 20 percent of the start-ups are 
innovative start-ups, while the rest are traditional start-ups. The founders were predominantly 
male (87 percent), 35 years old on average, and often highly qualified (35 percent held a 
university degree and 12 percent a doctoral degree).  
Dependent Variable 
There are several ways how credit constraints can be measured. Previous research has tended 
to use indirect indicators of wealth, inheritance or windfall gains to test the effect of captal 
constraints on performance (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Black, de Meza and Jeffreys, 1992, 
Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994, Lind and Ohlsson, 1996). A positive correlation between wealth and 
entrepreneurship performance is said to indicate capital constraints. The drawback of these 
approaches is that they do not reveal whether the entrepreneurs were basically able to obtain 
external capital if needed. Parker and van Praag (2005) construct a measure of capital 
constraints in which the total amount of capital used at the start of the new business is related 
to the amount of capital required. Although we do not have hard facts on the amount or the 
conditions of our founders’ credit, we do have a very good indirect indicator that should 
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reflect all these aspects simultaneously. In our survey, founders were asked whether, during 
their start-up phase, it was difficult to obtain the credit they initially needed for their start-up. 
They answered using a 5-point Likert scale from 1 = very problematic to 5 = not at all 
problematic. It is important to note that our rating of the credit problems does not refer to the 
current situation in the company but to the situation at the beginning of the start up. In using a 
subjective rating we assume that less favorable hard facts will be reliably reflected in a lower 
subjective evaluation score. Such an assumption is supported by Binks and Ennew (1996), 
who argue that a subjective classification is a useful proxy for credit constraints because 
individual difficulties in obtaining credit correspond to unfavorable credit conditions. 
Moreover, Van Praag (2003) uses a direct individual indicator for initial credit constraints 
which is very similar to ours (“Did you experience problems in obtaining sufficient (external) 
capital at the start of your venture?”). On the other hand, Parker (2004) points out that claims 
by survey respondents that they face(d) credit constraints should be treated with some caution 
because they are prone to self-serving bias whereby entrepreneurs might blame banks for 
inherent shortcomings. However, since our respondents were asked a few years after start-up 
time, we assume that this bias had dissipated by the time of our survey. A subjective indicator, 
furthermore, has the advantage of capturing various kinds of constraints in just one indicator. 
On the basis of a large German data set, Egeln, Licht, and Steil (1997) for example find a very 
strong correlation between a firm’s self-classification of credit problems and the official 
rating given by Creditreform, Germany’s largest credit-rating agency. Thus, altogether we are 
confident that a subjective rating of credit problems during the start-up phase reliably 
identifies the real credit problems of the start-up.iv  
Major Explanatory Variable 
To test our main hypothesis we include as our major explanatory variable we include a 
dummy variable taking the value 1 if the founder is a college dropout, otherwise 0. 
Fortunately, our data contains the information if the founder has studied at a university in the 
past, but dropped out for good without finishing his studies.  
Control Variables 
As mentioned before, banks finance promising new business ideas if they can evaluate their 
potential success properly. A broad literature on successful start-ups offers insight on which 
factors are relevant for start-up success. Thus, in addition to our major explanatory variable, 
we use a number of standard control variables which are specified in table 1.  
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Table 1 
Description of Variables and their expected Impact on the Difficulty obtaining Start-Up 
Credit 
Variable Name 
 
         Variable Description  Mean Std.dev Exp. 
Sign 
Dependent Variable 
CC Credit constraints: subjective evaluation of problems obtaining 
initial credit [1 = not problematic at all, 5 = very problematic 
(measured at the start of the new venture)] 
 3.08 1.49 
 
Major Explanatory Variable 
DROPOUT Founders with college dropout experience [Yes = 1, No = 0]  0.06 0.24 + 
Educational Degrees 
PHD Doctoral Degree [0=no; 1=yes]   0.13 0.33 _ 
COLLEGE University Degree (Diploma, Magister Artium (M.A.) and other 
first degrees as highest educational degree) [0=no; 1=yes] 
 0.35 0.48 _ 
MASTER Master Craftsman [0=no; 1=yes]  0.11 0.32 _ 
APPRENT Apprenticeship training [0=no; 1=yes]  0.34 0.48 ? 
NOVOC  Founders without any vocational training [0=no; 1=yes]  0.07 0.24 + 
Other Controls 
PARTNER Start-up with a Partner ? [0=no; 1=yes]  0.37 0.48 _ 
INNOVSU Innovative start-up classified by industry at the start of the new 
venture (OECD list) [0=no; 1=yes] 
 0.19 0.40 + 
OWNINV Founder's Equity Investments (measured in 100,000 Euros)   0.82 4.19 _ 
DEBTC Debt capital? [0=no; 1=yes]  0.48 0.50 _ 
JOBEXP Prior job experience in the start-up industry [0=no; 1=yes]  0.77 0.42 _ 
FOUNDEXP Founding had prior founding experience) [0=no; 1=yes]  0.25 0.43 ? 
SECONDJ Founder has an additional second job in paid employment 
[0=no; 1=yes] 
 0.16 0.37 ? 
FAGE Founders’ age [measure in 10 years]  3.54 0.83 ? 
MALE Founder is male [0=no; 1=yes]  0.87 0.33 ? 
MARRIED Founder is married [0=no; 1=yes]  0.54 0.50 _ 
CHILD Founder has children [0=no; 1=yes]  0.51 0.50 ? 
MANUF Manufacturing [0=no; 1=yes]  0.15 0.36 ? 
TRADE Trade [0=no; 1=yes]  0.23 0.42 ? 
SERVICES Services [0=no; 1=yes]  0.62 0.49 ? 
a Note: Data stem from the Cologne Founder Study (CFS). 
 
First, we expect young and highly educated individuals as well as those with a second job in 
paid employment to be more likely to have a higher post-failure earning. This, i.e. the earning 
possibilities after a possible failure of the new venture, should be a good indicator for banks 
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whether the business starter can meet his credit obligations in any case. The study of Bates 
(1990) shows for example that highly educated entrepreneurs are more likely to create firms 
that stay in operation and, at the same time, that higher education is a major determinant of 
the financial capital structure of small business start-ups (see also Story, 1994). Thus, in our 
empirical analyses we distinguish different educational levels based on the educational history 
of the founder. We differentiate between founders who hold a doctoral degree as their highest 
university degree, founders who hold a standard university degree, such as a Diploma, a 
Master’s or Magister Artium, founders who never received a university degree, but 
apprenticeship training or master craftsman training as their highest vocational degree. The 
reference group consists of the founders with no vocational training whatsoever. As 
mentioned above, we also include age (measured in years) and having a second job. Yet, 
because lenders may be more willing to lend to older, more experienced founders and because 
having a second job requires time which cannot be invested in the new venture, we expect the 
effect of age and second job to remain unsettled. We also include team venture start-up in our 
models because we expect multiple ownership to facilitate access to bank loans. To cope with 
everyday challenges founders need specific knowledge about technological details, products 
and processes which they quickly combine with information about commercial opportunities 
and economic or legal constraints (e.g. Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). This, in turn, 
requires a broad set of skills, aptitudes, and insights which are rarely encountered in one 
single person. Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon and Woo (1994) or Backes-Gellner, Mohnen and 
Werner (2007) for example show, the presence of partners can help to overcome these start-up 
challenges. Furthermore, we also include the amount of personal equity capital because own 
investments should mitigate principal-agent conflicts between banks and lenders. The more a 
business owner will commit own resources to the venture, the better a bank should be 
convinced that they are investing in a serious idea (Blumberg and Letterie, 2008). We also 
differentiate between innovative and traditional start-ups. We believe that founders of 
innovative start-ups respective their market partners are faced with even stronger asymmetric 
information problems than founders of traditional start-ups due to the fact that in former 
virtually no prior history of comparable cases exist whatsoever. In a first instance, this should 
make it more difficult to overcome credit constraints for innovative start-ups (Backes-Gellner 
and Werner, 2007). Further, several studies show that demographic characteristics and the 
social background of the founder is related to success (see Parker 2004 for an overview). 
Married individuals are more likely to become successful entrepreneurs because their spouses 
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offer them financial and emotional support. Yet, we expect the effect of children on financial 
access to be unsettled because children may require money and time which cannot be invested 
in the new venture. Research on gender reveals differences in risk preference between males 
and females with females being more risk adverse entrepreneurs (Wagner, 2007). 
Conventional wisdom asserts that a entrepreneur has to make risky decisions in uncertain 
environments to become successful (Khilstrom and Laffont, 1979). On the other hand, recent 
empirical research with focus on the question if individuals face difficulties in raising funds 
from financial institutions when starting a business show no credit discrimination based on 
gender (e.g. Storey, 1994). Thus again, we expect the effect of gender to be unsettled. We also 
include business ownership experience. Business ownership experience reveals a good deal 
about the competence of the founder and according human capital theory, those with 
entrepreneurial experience should perform better than others. In reality, however, not all types 
of experience indicate enhanced knowledge alone. The experience of failure, for example, 
might equally be a signal for entrepreneurial weakness and, thus, an argument for banks not to 
give any funds to the founder (Werner and Kay, 2006). Unfortunately, we are not able to 
differentiate between founders with successful and unsuccessful entrepreneurial experience. 
Consequently, we also expect the effect of business ownership experience to stay unsettled. 
Furthermore, Blumberg and Letterie (2008) show that experience obtained in previous jobs 
affect access to external financial resources. As a consequence we include previous job 
experience in our models. Finally, all regressions include dummies indicating economic 
sectors (manufacturing, trade, services) and founding year (1992-1997) to catch different 
industry and time cycle effects.   
4 Empirical Results 
To test our credit market implications, we use an ordered probit model.v The dependent 
variable should be interpreted as follows: the higher the subjective credit problem indicator, 
the more difficulty the founder experienced obtaining the required credit during the start-up 
phase (the situation is worse); the lower the indicator, the easier it was to obtain the required 
credit (the situation is better). Table 2 displays the results for three different models.vi 
Note: Data stem from the Cologne Founder Study (CFS). *, **, ***  denote statistical significance at an error level of 10, 5, 
and 1 percent. 1 Reference: founders without any vocational training. 2 Logarithm of Founder's Equity Investments 
Table 2 
Ordered probit regression results: College Dropouts and credit market constraints 
  Model I Model II Model III 
 Co
(Std.
eff. 
Dev.) 
Co
(Std.
eff. 
Dev.) 
Co
(Std.
eff. 
Dev.) 
Major Explanatory Variable    
¾ DROPOUTS    0.
(0.
78158** 
37402) 
Educational Degrees    
¾ PHD 1  -0.
(0.
96863**
46883) 
-0.
(0.
85129* 
47645) 
¾ COLLEGE 1  -0.
(0.
89024**
41712) 
-0.
(0.
76306* 
42616) 
¾ MASTER 1  -1.
(0.
25782**
50826) 
-1.
(0.
29126** 
51404) 
¾ APPRENT 1  -1.
(0.
08036***
41550) 
-1.
(0.
03716** 
42145) 
Other Controls    
¾ PARTNER -0.
(0.
23074 
17246) 
-0.
(0.
25238 
17402) 
-0.
(0.
30791* 
17661) 
¾ INNOVSU 0.
(0.
43554** 
21904) 
0.
(0.
45934**
22083) 
0.
(0.
45529** 
22149) 
¾ OWNINV 2 -0.
(0.
04954** 
02229) 
-0.
(0.
04784**
02287) 
-0.
(0.
05166** 
02295) 
¾ DEBTC -0.
(0.
47542*** 
17038) 
-0.
(0.
44719**
17830) 
-1.
(0.
50987*** 
18107) 
¾ JOBEXP -0.
(0.
07089 
20287) 
-0.
(0.
09630 
21244) 
-0.
(0.
09577 
21357) 
¾ FOUNDEXP -0.
(0.
00030 
20067) 
-0.
(0.
14244 
20927) 
-0.
(0.
17072 
21018) 
¾ SECONDJ 0.
(0.
06878 
24920) 
-0.
(0.
00864 
25513) 
-0.
(0.
03741 
25585) 
¾ FAGE 0.
(0.
01074 
01235) 
0.
(0.
01708 
01302) 
0.
(0.
01914 
01308) 
¾ MALE 0.
(0.
22814 
26250) 
0.
(0.
13634 
26725) 
0.
(0.
05071 
27000) 
¾ MARRIED -0.
(0.
49579** 
19940) 
-0.
(0.
45304**
20316) 
-0.
(0.
37713* 
20673) 
¾ CHILD 0.
(0.
29444 
22073) 
0.
(0.
30422 
22608) 
0.
(0.
27824 
22686) 
¾ Industry (3) yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
¾ Year (6) yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
Number of obs. 
LR-Chi² 
R²-Pseudo 
189 
39.39** 
0.0665 
189 
47.23*** 
0.0797 
189 
51.66*** 
0.0872 
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In a first model, we use a specification that includes only the vector of control variables that 
was described in Table 1. In a second model, we include the educational degrees and in a third 
model, we also include our explanatory variable of interest, i.e. if the founder has dropped out 
of college or not. Our hypothesis that college dropout founders to have more problems 
obtaining the credit they ask for than founders without college dropout experience is borne 
out by the data. We find that credit problems are significantly worse for college dropouts 
which is in accordance with our assumption that banks use this information to reduce 
information asymmetry for start-up credits (see model III). Furthermore, an incremental F-test 
clearly indicates that the variable DROPOUT adds explantory power to our model (X²=4.37; 
df=1, Prob<0.0366) which confirms the relevance of DROPOUT added in model III. 
 
Table 3 
Individual Predicted Probabilities: College Dropout Experience  
  Outcome Category (difficulty to obtein start-up credit)i 
Ideal Type 1 2 3 4 5 
¾ An “average individual” with college dropout 
experience 
0.056 0.057 0.199 0.202 0.486 
      
¾ An “average individual” without college 
dropout experience 
0.211 0.123 0.280 0.179 0.207 
Note: Data stem from the Cologne Founder Study (CFS). i 1 = not at all problematic to 5 = very problematic 
 
Last but not least, table 3 shows the results of predicted probabilities for “avarage” individuals 
with and without college dropout experience, i.e. we report the discrete change in the dummy 
variable DROPOUT evaluated at the multivariate means of the control variables. We can 
show that, on the one side, the probability of being in the highest category of our dependent 
variable (i.e. subjective evaluation of great difficulties obtaining initial start-up credit from 
banks) is 48.6 % for college dropouts, but only 20.7 % for those without dropout experience. 
On the other side, for college dropouts the predicted probability of being in the lowest 
category (i.e. having no difficulties at obtaining the credit initially needed) is only 5.7 %, yet 
21.1 % for those without dropout experience.  
Thus, we can conclude that college dropout experience is not only significant, but has a strong 
effect on credit availability for founders. Withdrawing from higher education makes it more 
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difficult to obtain credit, which supports our assumption that banks use college dropout 
experience as a screening device to evaluate the unobservable inherent quality of the new 
venture. Because banks cannot build that much on experience and prior information or 
reputation, they also use the fact that people withdraw from higher education as an 
educational signal when deciding upon credits.  
As for our control variables, in line with prior research we find that banks obviously use 
multiple signals if available (e.g. Storey, 1994; Blumberg and Letterie, 2008). We find that 
higher education (i.e. those with expected higher post-failure earnings), multiple ownership, 
ressource commitment, debt capital and being married seem to convince banks that they are 
investing in good projects. Thus, it makes it easier for these people to obtain credit. Contrary, 
founders of innovative start-ups seem to have more difficulties to obtain the credit they need 
than traditional start-ups in the beginning of their start-up due to the fact that banks are faced 
with even stronger asymmetric information problems in this case. All other control variables 
are not significant on any conventional level which is mostly in line with previous literature 
and thus a rather unspectacular result. 
5 Conclusion 
The purpose of the study at hand was to shed light on the relationship between educational 
indicators and bank’s entrepreneurial financing. The vast majority of small firms and business 
start-ups relies on commercial banks for obtaining the financial funds they need (Keasey and 
Watson, 1992; Werner, 2007). Yet, start-ups are faced with the problem that there is no prior 
history of similar production or business processes. As a result, start-ups, and their market 
partners are faced with severe problems of asymmetric information. In our paper, we have 
focused on the question if screening can solve or or substantially reduce these information 
problems and thereby increasing the potential success of start-ups. We focus our analysis on 
credit market problems because it has been shown in literature that these are crucial to the 
success of start-ups, i.e. shortage of credit in the early start-up phase (Parker, 2004). We 
assume that banks search for credible indicators to evaluate their quality of the new venture. 
We have argued that most of the instruments that reveal hidden information are unsuitable for 
start-ups since the business idea and the companies itself are both new. Yet, while there is no 
reputation or experience to build on, we show evidence that screening the educational 
biography of the founder is one plausible way of banks to deal with the information 
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asymmetries of entrepreneurs – namely college droupout experience. Based on screening 
theory, we provide empirical evidence that college dropout founders to have more problems 
obtaining the credit they ask for than founders without college dropout experience. We tested 
our hypotheses using a dataset of 189 start-ups collected in and around Cologne in 1998/99. 
Consistent with what we expected, we find that college dropouts have a more problems 
obtaining the credit they initially need to start their venture.  
To summarize, in the paper we have shown that screening for educational characteristics can 
be a powerfull instrument for banks to cope with typical problems of asymmetric information 
in start-up credit markets - an aspect which has rarely been analyzed due to a lack of adequate 
data. Fortunately, we dispose of a unique database covering not only a wide range of variables 
on the newly founded enterprises but also on the founders and their educational background 
and personal history.  
It should be noted however, that our study has some limitations, which should be kept in mind 
when considering our results. On the one side, we rely on self-reported measures. Especially 
our subjective rating as an indicator of credit problems in the beginning of the new venture is 
controversial in literature. On the other side, our research design is retrospective and, thus, 
prone to recall bias. Yet, even when keeping these limitations in mind, we are very confident 
that our results indicate the important role educational screening can play in the early stages 
of entrepreneurship financing. Last but not least, the quality of our estimations is supported by 
the results of our control variables, which are in line with prior research results. 
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i Asymmetric information and adverse selection does not necessarily result in credit rationing. And credit 
constraints do not always imply inefficiency or market failure (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1983; Besanko and Thakor, 
1987). De Meza and Webb (1987) for example propose a model with assumptions similar to those of the most 
influential credit rationing model of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), but with the opposite effects; i.e. over-investment 
and too much entrepreneurship instead of credit rationing. However, the majority of studies assumes credit 
rationing and analyze either Type I rationing (rationing via loan size) or Type II rationing (rationing via selection 
of loan applicants) and their negative consequences such as a shortage of start-ups.   
ii However, tighter constraints might still not be inefficient. They might decrease profits of entrepreneurs, but this 
does not necessarily imply inefficiency or market failure (Parker and van Praag 2005) because borrowing 
constraints can be an efficient market reaction. On the other hand, if one assumes positive externalities like 
innovation spillovers, which are often shown to be important in a regional context, credit restrictions might 
become a problem and could justify government intervention to relax them - but only in special cases. 
iii The data were collected with financial support from the German National Science Foundation (DFG) under 
project number STE 628/5-1, the German Founder Bank (Deutsche Ausgleichsbank, DtA) and the Cologne 
Savings Bank. I thank Petra Moog and Güldem Demirer for introducing us to their dataset. 
iv Since our subjective rating refers to credit problems in obtaining the initial credit during the start-up phase, 
there is no need to control for performance variables as would be the case if we asked about credit problems in 
an already running company. Hence typical endogeneity problems connected with entering performance 
variables in a credit constraints regression are also avoided. 
v The dependent variable “credit problems” is ordinal which makes OLS regressions inappropriate. 
vi Before discussing interpretation, it is important to test the parallel regression assumption which is implicit in 
ordinal regression models (see Long and Freese, 2003). Without going into details, we test the assumption by 
running an approximate LR test (Wolf and Gould, 1998). Fortunately, in our empirical models the parallel 
regression assumption is not violated. 
